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The Measurement of Tax Elasticity in India: 
A Time Series Approach 
"It was only for the good of his subjects that he collected taxes from them, just as the Sun draws 
moisture from the Earth to give it back a thousand fold" –  
                                    --Kalidas in Raghuvansh eulogizing KING DALIP. 
 
Hem Acharya 
Faculty of Management Studies, University of Delhi 
 
Abstract 
Revenue generation is an important goal of tax reform. The built-in responsiveness of 
revenues to changes in income, tax elasticity, provides very critical information for tax policy 
formulation. This paper utilises a time series approach to empirically estimate tax  elasticities 
for India for the period 1991-2010. Tax elasticities are computed for income, turnover, excise, 
import and total taxes for the post-reform period. The elasticity coefficients reveal a low 
responsiveness of taxes to income growth and the value being less than unity in most of the 
cases.  
  
1. Introduction 
It is essential to estimate built-in tax elasticity or tax elasticity which measures percentage 
increase in tax revenue due to the changes in the base caused by a one percent rise in GDP. 
However, estimation suffers from a specification bias due to the lack of an observable 
quantitative variable capable of reflecting all changes in an individual (or overall) tax system in 
public finance. 
As the primary purpose of tax policy adjustment in developing countries is to increase the 
revenue, the study of tax elasticity and various parameters affecting tax collection becomes 
important. An elastic tax system is desirable especially to developing countries. It is also 
important for revenue forecasting purposes, for analyzing the automatic stabilizing property of 
tax system and examining the progressivity of tax system.  
Tax elasticity is defined as 
TE =  %∆Revenue ÷ %∆Base.  ------------------------------- (1) 
Revenue is calculated as it would have been if there were no changes in the tax laws, including 
the tax rates or bases. Thus the tax elasticity is a hypothetical construct. It tries to reconstruct 
what would have happened if there had been no changes in the tax rules - i.e. what tax revenue 
would have been if last year’s laws continued to apply this year. The increases are measured in 
real terms i.e., after adjusting for inflation for an unbiased analysis and result.  
 
There are varieties of taxes, such as import tax, export tax, excise tax, sales/value 
added/turnover tax, and corporate income tax and so on; throughout this study, the term 
"individual tax” will be used to refer to each of these taxes. Each tax has its own tax system--a 
set of laws and regulations governing the process of estimation, assessment and collection of its 
corresponding tax revenue--which will be called the "individual tax system". The term 
"discretionary tax measures (DTMs)" will be used to describe changes in these systems which 
include changes in statutory tax rates, tax bases, tax allowances and credits, and of tax 
administrative efficiency. 
Above equation of tax elasticity (TE) gives rise to a new definition of elasticity as the ratio of the 
Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) to the Average Tax Rate (ATR).  
TE = MTR/ATR    -------------------------------------- (2) 
Where 
MTR  = ∆T / ∆Y  -------------------------------------- (3) 
 = dt/dy 
 = T’(Y) 
And  
ATR = T/Y --------------------------------------------- (4) 
This paper discusses the tax elasticity in the context of Indian Tax System from the period of 
1991 to 2010. It attempts to provide insight to revenue responsiveness of Indian tax structure. 
Though there are number of methodologies employed to determine the tax elasticity this paper 
resorts to the traditional time series regression model to empirically examine tax elasticity of 
tax structure. Other methodologies are not considered mainly because of the data requirement 
by them.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses about the historical 
review of Indian tax structure. Section 3 outlines various international and national studies in 
this area of research. Section 4 states the research design and the paper goes on to Analysis of 
data and findings according to the relevant models run. 
  
2. Historical Background  
There are two types of taxes viz., 1) Direct taxes ( eg. Income tax, Wealth tax ) and 2) Indirect 
taxes ( eg. Custom duty, Excise duty etc.). Direct taxes are the taxes which are not shifted i.e., 
the incidence of of which falls on persons who pay them to the Government. Similarly Indirect 
taxes are the taxes in which the burden of paying Tax is shifted through a change in price. 
Direct taxes come under progressive taxation. It creates better civic consciousness. It also 
serves the purpose of transference of income from rich to poor.  
Indirect taxes are difficult to evade. It is generally included in the price. Indirect taxes on drinks, 
narcotics and tobacco serve a social purpose by discouraging their consumption. 
Indian tax system is characterized by : a) High dependence on indirect taxes b) low average 
effective tax rates and tax productivity c) High marginal effective tax rates and large tax-
induced Distortions on investment and financing decisions.  
Income tax in India was introduced in 1860 , discontinued in 1873 and reintroduced in  1886. 
More than 130 countries worldwide have introduced VAT, India being one of the last few to 
introduce it. VAT was introduced in 1999 and was implemented in April,2005 in some states. 
Tax revenues form about 20% of the total national income of India (2005-2006). Amongst the 
third world countries India is one of the high taxes countries. 
Among the working 40% working population only 2.5% are liable to pay income tax in India. So 
we can say that Indian tax structure relies on a very narrow population base. Agricultural 
income is wholly exempt from the income tax despite the fact that a new class of rich farmers 
have emerged in country who can easily pay taxes. Service sector which accounts for more than 
50% of GDP contributes just 7.8% towards tax revenue and 0.8% towards GDP. The  cost of 
collection of tax has increased from Rs. 543 crores in 1990-91 to more than Rs. 3663 crores in  
2006-2007 
  
3. Literature Review 
a. International Context 
While researching about tax elasticity in his paper “An Econometric  Method for Estimating the 
Tax Elasticity and  the Impact  on Revenues of Discretionary  Tax Measures” , Jaber Ehdaie 
classifies all the individual taxes to major five categories (1) corporate income tax, (2)  other 
direct taxes (individual income tax, social security, payroll tax, tax on property and other taxes 
on net income and profits), (3) import tax ( tariff/customs  duties and other charges), (4) tax on 
exports, and (5) tax on domestic consumption (general  sales, turnover or value added taxes, 
selective excises on goods and services, taxes on use of goods or property and permission to 
perform activities, stamp tax and other domestic indirect taxes).  
There is not a single economic channel through which changes in the individual tax systems 
affect individual tax bases. Because of this this paper uses private consumption, imports, 
exports, value added in non-agriculture sector and GDP respectively as proxy variables for 
potential tax bases of domestic consumption tax, import tax, export tax, corporate income tax 
and other direct taxes. 
The major part of this analysis lies in demonstrating that the elasticity of reported income is not 
a primitive parameter and it identifies strength of its dependence on a particular administrative 
instrument of the tax base. It turns out that the elasticity of taxable income varies 
systematically with the tax base and that this eﬀect is quantitatively important. (Wojciech 
Kopczuk 2003) 
Wojciech Kopczuk (2003) argues that there are two major aspects of the tax system that are 
responsible for determining the broadness of the tax base. First, deductions and adjustments 
explicitly exclude parts of income from taxation. As they vary, the tax base of the taxpayer 
varies. Second, tax bases of itemizers and non-itemizers are diﬀerent. Importantly, the eﬀects 
of such changes vary also cross-sectionally. Changes in the standard deduction aﬀect the 
itemization status (and therefore the tax base) only of those individuals whose gain from 
itemization are small enough. The elimination of charitable deduction for non-itemizers aﬀects 
the tax base of people making charitable contributions but not of the others. Changes in the 
medical deduction aﬀect the tax base of itemizers who have high enough medical expenses. 
These eﬀects can interact suggesting that the tax base eﬀects are not simple functions of 
income (and, therefore, aiding in the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect). 
The elasticity of income determines only the cost of taxation, while any complete analysis of 
policy requires understanding beneﬁts as well. There may be trade-oﬀs involved in the choice 
of tax base to the extent that deductions from the tax base are socially beneﬁcial on, for 
example, redistributive grounds. Also, a broader tax base may feature diﬀerent administrative 
costs (Yitzhaki, 1979; Wilson, 1989). 
The inverse relationship between tax rates and revenue is mentioned by Adam Smith in The 
Wealth of Nations (1776) – 
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed 
commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently afford a smaller 
revenue to government than what might be drawn from more moderate taxes. (Book V, 
Chapter II) 
After the introduction of the Laffer curve in 1974, the quality of debate deteriorates 
significantly. Jude Wanniski (1978) chronicles every fiscal catastrophe from the fall of the 
Roman Empire to the Great Depression and attributes each of them to some tax hike occurring 
within a few years in either direction. At various points in his analysis Wanniski suggests (a) that 
the mere existence of a prohibitive range implies taxes should be reduced, (b) that the peak of 
the curve is at a 25 percent tax rate, and (c) that the peak of the curve "is the point at which the 
electorate desires to be taxed".-' The welfare maximizing government would operate 
somewhere on the normal range with the size of its budget determined by standard cost—
benefit analysis. 
For the opposition, Kiefer (1978) asserts that there is no tax rate for the overall economy which 
can be measured on the horizontal axis, and that "the Laffer Curve represents a gross 
simplification of a major portion of macro-economics into a single curved line." These 
arguments are not compelling, either, in view of the large number of economic models which 
oversimplify in order to comprehend and convey economic phenomena. Kiefer also begrudges 
the supply-side concentration, reminding us that income and substitution effects tend to be 
offsetting. "By concentrating primarily on incentive and supply-side effects, the Laffer Curve 
largely ignores the actual mechanism by which fiscal policy exerts its biggest and most 
immediate impact - demand side effects." One gets the feeling that these antagonists are 
talking past 
Tax Stability: The revenue from different taxes varies from year to year.  Taxes whose revenue 
is relatively stable, or whose revenue is negatively correlated with the revenue from other 
taxes, are likely to be particularly helpful in giving stability to the overall stream of revenue.  
Revenue stability is desirable, at least from the government’s perspective, in that it makes it 
easier to put together plausible spending and borrowing plans for the year ahead. A simple 
measure of the stability of tax revenue is the coefficient of variation (CV), which is defined as 
the standard deviation of tax revenue (as a fraction of GDP usually) divided by its mean;  i.e.  
Coefficient of Variation = Standard Deviation ÷ Mean. 
 
  
b. National Context 
In estimating the built-in elasticity of a tax either the time series data on tax revenues need to 
be adjusted to eliminate the effects of discretionary tax measures, or a suitable estimation 
methodology has to be adopted.  The most appropriate method would clearly depend upon the 
availability, nature and reliability of information on tax revenues, discretionary changes in the 
tax structure and tax bases.  Over the years, at least four approaches have been used :  
(1) Proportional adjustment;  
(2) Constant rate structure;  
(3) Divisia index; and  
(4) Econometric methods. 
In the Indian case, estimates of tax yields arising out of discretionary changes in tax 
rates and coverages are routinely available in the budget documents.  Therefore, the 
application of the proportional adjustment method is perfectly feasible for estimating tax 
elasticities in India.  There have been several such attempts, but the weight of general opinion 
is that these estimates are not particularly accurate, primarily because of the questionable 
reliability of the budget estimates of the effects of the discretionary changes.  This judgment is 
based primarily on comparisons between the predicted and the actual tax collections for in-
sample forecasts.  (Pronab Sen) 
The result of this dissatisfaction with the methodology has been that the use of 
elasticity estimates in forecasting tax collections has all but ceased in India, and recourse is 
increasingly being taken to the use of buoyancy estimates for most analytical purposes.  Pronab 
Sen argues that this is unfortunate, since the use of buoyancies in making forecasts or 
projections implicitly assumes that there is a well-defined trend in the discretionary changes 
that have been made in the past, and that this trend will continue in the future as well.   
  
4. Research and Design: 
 
Objectives: 
To determine Tax Elasticity for India from period 1990-91 to 2009-2010 
 
Variable Selection: 
For the purpose the variables used for the study purpose are: 
LTDT: Natural Log Total Direct Tax 
LTIDT: Natural Log Total Indirect Tax 
LGT: Natural Log Gross Tax 
LGDPF: Natural Log GDP at current prices factor cost 
LGDPM: Natural Log GDP at current prices market price 
 
The data pertaining to Direct, Indirect and Gross tax is only taken as there is no discretionary 
tax changes data available for the various constituents of the Indirect tax such as Customs, 
Excise and Service tax for India. This has put limitation of a more meaningful study. 
The tax revenue and corresponding tax base will be taken as shown below: 
Tax Revenue Proxy Base 
Direct Tax GDP current at factor cost 
Indirect Tax GDP current at factor cost 
Gross Tax GDP current at market price 
 
Sample Selection: 
The data pertaining to taxes and the GDP has been taken from the RBI database: 
http://dbie.rbi.org.in/InfoViewApp/listing/main.do?appKind=InfoView&service=%2FInfoViewAp
p%2Fcommon%2FappService.do 
 
The data pertaining to the discretionary changes in tax and the resultant revenue loss/gain has 
been taken from the Budget speeches from 1991-92 to 2009-2010: 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/ 
 
Time Period: 
The time period selected for the study is between1991-92 and 2009-2010. The reason for the 
same is that there has been structural break in 1990-91 in Indian scenario due to various LPG 
policies adopted by India and opening up of its economy. From the tax base perspective there 
has been phenomenon changes starting this period and thus only this part is relevant for the 
study. Using data prior to 1990-91 with later data will result in spurious results and thus 
incorrect model. 
 
5. Methodology: 
We will first convert our tax revenue series to the adjusted form, adjusting for the discretionary 
changes in the tax over the years. Our base year will be 1991-92 and thereon we will adjust our 
tax revenue as shown below: 
 
Where, 
AT n-1 = the Adjusted Tax 
T n-1=actual Tax revenue 
D n = Revenue effect of discretionary changes 
For the reference year we will have: 
 
Now the time series based regression model will be used to perform the study. Tax buoyancies 
have been calculated to measure the effect of the discretionary changes in the various taxes.  
The estimation of the tax elasticity will be done through the regression analysis based on the 
partitioning approach where the tax elasticity will be divided into tax to base and base to 
income elasticity. The equations can be represented as shown below: 
Tax to Base: 
 Where: 
T = Adjusted Tax revenue 
X = Tax Base 
 
Base to Income Elasticity: 
 
Where: 
B = Tax Base 
Y = GDP at current market price 
 
Now the coefficients calculated in above regression equations (b and c) can be used to give an 
overall estimate of the elasticity by using equation:  
Overall elasticity = b*c 
Limitations: 
1) The data is for overall categories of direct tax and indirect tax only and should have been for 
the subgroups for better matching with the tax bases. At present it has lead to the 
generalization and thus the results will be very general in nature. 
2) The data pertaining to 1991 and hence forth has been taken and so the number of 
observations are very less but the more data collection is restricted by the availability of 
coherent data in Indian perspective. 
 
6. Analysis and Findings: 
 
Stationarity Test: Using ADF Method  
H0: The variable has a unit root 
 
 
Variable ADF(c,t,p) t-Statistics Prob. 
LTDT ADF(0,0,0)  7.871282  1.0000 
LTIDT ADF(0,0,0)  4.296678  0.9999 
LGT ADF(0,0,0)  6.584881  1.0000 
LGDPF ADF(0,0,0)  2.530098  0.9947 
LGDPM ADF(0,0,0)  2.324860  0.9922 
ΔLTDT ADF(1,0,0) -3.783960  0.0123* 
ΔLTIDT ADF(1,0,0) -1.681008  0.0869** 
ΔLGT ADF(1,0,0) -2.947668  0.0606** 
ΔLGDPF ADF(1,0,0) -2.809527  0.0790** 
ΔLGDPM ADF(1,0,0) -2.797117  0.0795** 
*Significant at 5% level 
**Significant at 10% level 
 All series found to be stationery at first level of difference only. 
 
Structural Break Tests: 
We need not perform the Perron structural breakpoint test due to various reasons: 
1) From the visual inspection the various taxes doesn’t show any significant deviation 
2)  It is well known that the major structural break happens in 1990-91 for India and our 
data is after this time period only 
3) The data set is too small to have any meaningful analysis of the structural break as 
significant observations are required prior as well as after the break pint for the analysis 
 
Tax to Base Elasticity: 
Direct Tax: 
 
 
 
Direct Tax (t) coefficient Std. error t-statistics Prob 
Constant -12.35518 2.002790 -6.168981 0.0000* 
GDP factor 1.625584 0.135115 12.03112 0.0000* 
Direct tax (t-1) 0.639921 0.157910 4.052437 0.0012* 
Adjusted R-Square 0.989600    
S.E. of Regression 0.091626    
Sum squared resid 0.117534    
F-statistics 762.2104*    
*Significant at 5% level 
 
Indirect Tax: 
Indirect Tax (t) coefficient Std. error t-statistics Prob 
Constant -1.197869 0.739448 -1.619951 0.1275 
GDP factor 0.891738 0.050490 17.66178 0.0000* 
Indirect tax (t-1) 0.453193 0.179174 2.529344 0.0241* 
Adjusted R-Square 0.986652    
S.E. of Regression 0.059447    
Sum squared resid 0.049476    
F-statistics  
592.3545* 
   
*Significant at 5% level **Significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gross Tax: 
Gross Tax (t) Coefficient Std. error t-statistics Prob 
Constant -5.355947 1.267525 -4.225516 0.0007* 
GDP market 1.203048 0.084496 14.23786 0.0000* 
Gross tax (t-1) 0.639060 0.132908 4.808301 0.0002* 
Adjusted R-Square 0.991898    
S.E. of Regression 0.063000    
Sum squared resid 0.059535    
F-statistics  
1041.608* 
   
*Significant at 5% level **Significant at 10% level 
 
Base to Income elasticity: 
Now in order to estimate base to income elasticity, we have a problem of existence of 
simultaneity bias in the equations. The GDP at factor cost and GDP at market price were all 
thought to be endogenous and so a 2-Stage Least square (2SLS) approach has to be adopted. 
Now for LGDPF we have: 
 
LGDPF = α + β LGDPM + € 
 
But the LGDPM constitutes an endogenous variable in all the base to income and so need to be 
purged of the constituting stochastic content in the first stage of the 2SLS procedure. 
 
FIRST STAGE: 
LGDPMt = α + β LGDPMt-1 + γ LG + € 
Where: 
 
LGDPMt : Log GDP at market price 
LGDPMt-1 : Delayed Log GDP at market price 
LG: Log of Government spending 
 
Here Government spending (LG) and lagged value of LGDPM are two exogenous variables that 
have been used to estimate the fitted values in the first stage of the 2SLS. Now we will proceed 
to second stage where we will be using the fitted value (Y) in the equations to find the base to 
elasticity. 
 
SECOND STAGE: 
LGDPFt = α + β Yt + € 
Where: 
 
LGDPFt : Log GDP at factor cost 
Yt : Fitted value of Log GDP at market price 
 
The results are as shown below: 
 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP_FACTOR  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 12:58   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2009   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: C GDP_MARKET GOVT_SPENDING 
GDP_MARKET(-1) 
     
Variable Coefficie
nt 
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     C -
0.16878
0.030211 -
5.586858 
0.0001 
4 
GDP_MARKET 1.00559
0 
0.002076 484.2787 0.0000 
     R-squared 0.99993
6 
    Mean dependent 
var 
14.45042 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.99993
2 
    S.D. dependent var 0.591270 
S.E. of regression 0.00488
4 
    Sum squared resid 0.000358 
F-statistic 234525.
8 
    Durbin-Watson stat 1.492414 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000
0 
    Second-Stage SSR 0.000358 
J-statistic 5.99299
3 
    Instrument rank 4 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.04996
2 
   
          
 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP_MARKET  
Method: Two-Stage Least Squares  
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 13:03   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2009   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
Instrument specification: C GDP_MARKET GOVT_SPENDING 
GDP_MARKET(-1) 
     
Variable Coefficie
nt 
Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
C -2.39E-
12 
6.19E-13 -
3.864063 
0.0015 
GDP_MARKET 1.00000
0 
4.26E-14 2.35E+13 0.0000 
     R-squared 1.00000
0 
    Mean dependent 
var 
14.53794 
Adjusted R-
squared 
1.00000
0 
    S.D. dependent var 0.587965 
S.E. of regression 1.00E-13     Sum squared resid 1.50E-25 
F-statistic 5.52E+2
6 
    Durbin-Watson stat 0.045565 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000
0 
    Second-Stage SSR 1.36E-12 
J-statistic 0.00012
0 
    Instrument rank 4 
Prob(J-statistic) 0.99994
0 
   
      
Hence the elasticity can be summarized as below: 
Tax Elasticity 
Tax Coefficient SE 
Direct Tax 1.625584 0.135115 
Indirect Tax 0.891738 0.050490 
Gross Tax 1.203048 0.084496 
 
Tax Buoyancy 
Tax Coefficient SE 
Direct Tax 1.005590 0.002076 
Indirect Tax 1.005590 0.002076 
Gross Tax 1.000000 4.26E-14 
 
Overall elasticity 
Tax Elasticity 
Direct Tax 1.634671 
Indirect Tax 0.896722 
Gross Tax 1.203048 
 
As can be seen from the results: 
Tax Elasticity of Direct tax is high at 1.62 compared to other taxes and thus showing that 
changes in taxes has been higher than the changes in tax base and thus showing that more and 
more people from the tax base are paying more taxes. This is a healthy sign and can lead to 
lowering of effective tax rate with time. This can also be result of increasing effective tax rate 
for individuals and the corporate and thus showing the increasing tax burden. In former case 
the trend is favorable and in the later it is not. For indirect tax the elasticity is less than 1 and 
thus the chnge in tax revenue collection is not keeping up with the changes in the tax base. This 
shows that government has been lenient or conservative with the tax collection in indirect tax 
area. For overall gross tax collection the elasticity is again high at 1.2 and shows that govt has 
been able to get more tax revenue collection with relatively less changing tax base. It might be 
advantageous in short term in terms of revenues but in long run it can burden tax payers 
leading to more and more black money and non-disclosures. 
In terms of tax buoyancy, both direct tax and indirect tax shows nearly 1 as elasticity as 
expected. There is no deviation from the expected results. 
The overall elasticity remains same as tax elasticity as there is not much different from 1 for tax 
buoyancy. 
 
7. Summary and Recommendations: 
 The overall outlook looks good for India as the elasticity calculated are high and more than 1 
and thus shows that the tax revenue collections responds better to the changes in tax base and 
income. The collection always is more than change in the tax base and so either through higher 
effective tax rates or better compliance, the tax collections exceeds changes in the tax base. 
  
APPENDIX 
Data available: 
Years Total 
Direct 
Tax 
Servic
e Tax 
Excise 
Tax 
Custom
s  
Indirect 
tax 
Gross 
Tax 
GDP at 
factor 
cost 
currect 
prices 
Private 
consum
ption at 
market 
price 
Private 
Consumpt
ion 
Governme
nt 
Consumpt
ion 
Imports of 
goods and 
service 
GDP at 
current 
market 
price 
1991-92 15207 NA 28110 22257 52059 67266 594168 451815 435723 74814 47850.8 654729 
1992-93 18132 NA 30831 23776 56434 74566 681517 506915 490823 84720 63374.5 752591 
1993-94 20298 NA 31697 22193 55392 75690 792150 581447 562932 98279 73101.0 865805 
1994-95 26966 
407 
37347 26789 65328 92294 925239 669124 651951 109346 89970.7 1015764 
1995-96 33563 
862 
40187 35757 77661 111224 1083289 769542 751734 129572 122678.1 1191813 
1996-97 38891 
1059 
45008 42851 89871 128762 1260710 905672 886559 146933 138919.7 1378617 
1997-98 48260 1586 47962 40193 90960 139220 1401934 981262 965339 173780 154176.3 1527158 
1998-99 46600 1957 53246 48668 97197 143797 1616082 1130216 1121595 215232 178331.9 1751199 
1999-2000 57959 2128 61902 48420 113794 171753 1786526 1257541 1253643 252744 215236.5 1952036 
2000-01 68305 2613 68526 47542 120298 188603 1925017 1345583 1339274 265088 230872.8 2102314 
2001-02 69198 3302 72555 40268 117862 187060 2097726 1470302 1467195 281786 245199.7 2278952 
2002-03 83088 4122 82310 44852 133178 216266 2261415 1552618 1551365 290978 297205.9 2454561 
2003-04 105089 7891 90774 48629 149259 254348 2538170 1703546 1699486 310297 359107.7 2754620 
2004-05 132771 14200 99125 57611 172187 304958 2877701 1848110 1840406 338052 501064.5 3149407 
2005-06 165216 23055 111226 65067 199433 364649 3282385 2064296 2055387 375562 660408.9 3586743 
2006-07 230181 37597 117612 86327 241331 471512 3779384 2319826 2307822 421546 840506.3 4129173 
2007-08 312213 51301 123425 104119 279134 591347 4320892 2605859 2596084 479099 1012311.7 4723400 
2008-09 333818 60941 109343 99850 269680 603498 4933183 NA 2913386 616447 1374435.6 5321753 
2009-10 379559 58484 104659 84244 247357 626916 NA NA NA 
NA 
1356468.7 5856569 
 
Years Changes 
in Direct 
Tax 
Changes 
Service 
Tax 
Changes 
Excise 
Tax 
Changes 
Customs 
Tax 
Changes in 
Indirect 
Tax 
Changes 
in Gross 
Tax 
Adjusted 
Direct Tax 
Adjusted 
Indirect Tax 
Adjusted 
Gross Tax 
1991-92 2136 NA 1440 -744 696 3528 15916 52250 68513 
1992-93 795 NA 2210 -2023 187 1169 17844 51161 64211 
1993-94 -300 NA -2249 -3273 -5522 -11344 18580 53574 70347 
1994-95 -2430 NA 106 -2282 -2176 -6782 26277 64122 89286 
1995-96 -900 NA -311 -1179 -1490 -3880 34323 79208 115163 
1996-97 912 NA 760 950 1710 4332 41198 87554 126649 
1997-98 2651 NA 0 -2625 -2625 -2599 47342 99199 155773 
1998-99 -950 220 5009 3304 8533 16116 49012 102742 151657 
1999-2000 3100 NA NA NA 6234 9334 62988 115509 180104 
2000-01 5080 NA 3252 -1428 1824 8728 63623 122867 188227 
2001-02 -5500 NA 4677 -2128 2549 -402 74745 121890 200981 
2002-03 6000 NA 6700 -2200 4500 15000 80848 136183 216553 
2003-04 -2955 NA NA NA 3294 339 106638 149259 256000 
2004-05 2000 NA NA NA 0 2000 137685 172187 309994 
2005-06 6000 NA NA NA 0 6000 168109 201100 369325 
2006-07 4000 NA NA NA 2000 6000 232414 241331 473940 
2007-08 3000 NA NA NA 0 3000 312213 273205 585640 
2008-09 0 NA NA NA -5900 -5900 333818 271878 605429 
2009-10 0 NA NA NA 2000 2000 379559 247357 626916 
 
Stationarity Tests Results:  
 
Null Hypothesis: DIRECT_TAX has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=0) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  7.871282  1.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.699769  
 5% level  -1.961409  
 10% level  -1.606610  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 18 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DIRECT_TAX)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/10   Time: 23:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2010   
Included observations: 18 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DIRECT_TAX(-1) 0.016037 0.002037 7.871282 0.0000 
     
     R-squared -0.006753    Mean dependent var 0.178736 
Adjusted R-squared -0.006753    S.D. dependent var 0.095927 
S.E. of regression 0.096251    Akaike info criterion -1.789766 
Sum squared resid 0.157492    Schwarz criterion -1.740301 
Log likelihood 17.10790    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.782946 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.975558    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(DIRECT_TAX) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=0) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.783960  0.0123 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.886751  
 5% level  -3.052169  
 10% level  -2.666593  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 17 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DIRECT_TAX,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/10   Time: 23:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(DIRECT_TAX(-1)) -0.985366 0.260406 -3.783960 0.0018 
C 0.176243 0.053404 3.300172 0.0049 
     
     R-squared 0.488375    Mean dependent var -0.002795 
Adjusted R-squared 0.454267    S.D. dependent var 0.138221 
S.E. of regression 0.102109    Akaike info criterion -1.615419 
Sum squared resid 0.156394    Schwarz criterion -1.517394 
Log likelihood 15.73106    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.605675 
F-statistic 14.31835    Durbin-Watson stat 1.956256 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001801    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: INDIRECT_TAX has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=0) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  4.296678  0.9999 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.699769  
 5% level  -1.961409  
 10% level  -1.606610  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 18 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INDIRECT_TAX)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/10   Time: 23:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2010   
Included observations: 18 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     INDIRECT_TAX(-1) 0.007351 0.001711 4.296678 0.0005 
     
     R-squared -0.021186    Mean dependent var 0.086581 
Adjusted R-squared -0.021186    S.D. dependent var 0.083804 
S.E. of regression 0.084687    Akaike info criterion -2.045760 
Sum squared resid 0.121922    Schwarz criterion -1.996295 
Log likelihood 19.41184    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.038940 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.240370    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(INDIRECT_TAX) has a unit root 
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=0) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.681008  0.0869 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.708094  
 5% level  -1.962813  
 10% level  -1.606129  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 17 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(INDIRECT_TAX,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/10   Time: 23:36   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(INDIRECT_TAX(-1)) -0.302124 0.179728 -1.681008 0.1122 
     
     R-squared 0.140700    Mean dependent var -0.009829 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140700    S.D. dependent var 0.096331 
S.E. of regression 0.089298    Akaike info criterion -1.936661 
Sum squared resid 0.127585    Schwarz criterion -1.887649 
Log likelihood 17.46162    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.931789 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.812122    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: GROSS_TAX has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=0) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  6.584881  1.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.699769  
 5% level  -1.961409  
 10% level  -1.606610  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 18 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GROSS_TAX)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/10   Time: 23:36   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2010   
Included observations: 18 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GROSS_TAX(-1) 0.010211 0.001551 6.584881 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.000415    Mean dependent var 0.124009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000415    S.D. dependent var 0.079922 
S.E. of regression 0.079905    Akaike info criterion -2.161994 
Sum squared resid 0.108543    Schwarz criterion -2.112529 
Log likelihood 20.45795    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.155174 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.513294    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GROSS_TAX) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=0) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.947668  0.0606 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.886751  
 5% level  -3.052169  
 10% level  -2.666593  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 17 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GROSS_TAX,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/10/10   Time: 23:37   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(GROSS_TAX(-1)) -0.768411 0.260684 -2.947668 0.0100 
C 0.095353 0.039176 2.433935 0.0279 
     
     R-squared 0.366788    Mean dependent var -0.003821 
Adjusted R-squared 0.324574    S.D. dependent var 0.100690 
S.E. of regression 0.082752    Akaike info criterion -2.035816 
Sum squared resid 0.102717    Schwarz criterion -1.937791 
Log likelihood 19.30444    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.026073 
F-statistic 8.688748    Durbin-Watson stat 1.748350 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009981    
     
     
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: GDP_FACTOR has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  2.530098  0.9947 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.717511  
 5% level  -1.964418  
 10% level  -1.605603  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 16 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_FACTOR)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 00:02   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2009   
Included observations: 16 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GDP_FACTOR(-1) 0.003548 0.001402 2.530098 0.0240 
D(GDP_FACTOR(-1)) 0.567181 0.152700 3.714351 0.0023 
     
     R-squared 0.432668    Mean dependent var 0.123714 
Adjusted R-squared 0.392145    S.D. dependent var 0.027873 
S.E. of regression 0.021731    Akaike info criterion -4.703680 
Sum squared resid 0.006611    Schwarz criterion -4.607107 
Log likelihood 39.62944    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.698735 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.147327    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP_FACTOR) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.809527  0.0790 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.920350  
 5% level  -3.065585  
 10% level  -2.673459  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 16 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_FACTOR,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 00:03   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2009   
Included observations: 16 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(GDP_FACTOR(-1)) -0.462975 0.164788 -2.809527 0.0139 
C 0.054938 0.021794 2.520842 0.0245 
     
     R-squared 0.360539    Mean dependent var -0.004354 
Adjusted R-squared 0.314863    S.D. dependent var 0.026284 
S.E. of regression 0.021756    Akaike info criterion -4.701386 
Sum squared resid 0.006627    Schwarz criterion -4.604812 
Log likelihood 39.61109    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.696441 
F-statistic 7.893444    Durbin-Watson stat 2.063007 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013917    
     
     
 
 
Null Hypothesis: GDP_MARKET has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  2.324860  0.9922 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.708094  
 5% level  -1.962813  
 10% level  -1.606129  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 17 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_MARKET)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 00:06   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GDP_MARKET(-1) 0.003384 0.001456 2.324860 0.0345 
D(GDP_MARKET(-1)) 0.562801 0.162024 3.473566 0.0034 
     
     R-squared 0.360723    Mean dependent var 0.120694 
Adjusted R-squared 0.318105    S.D. dependent var 0.027654 
S.E. of regression 0.022836    Akaike info criterion -4.610812 
Sum squared resid 0.007822    Schwarz criterion -4.512787 
Log likelihood 41.19190    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.601068 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.813243    
     
     
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D(GDP_MARKET) has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=1) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.797117  0.0795 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.886751  
 5% level  -3.052169  
 10% level  -2.666593  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations 
        and may not be accurate for a sample size of 17 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(GDP_MARKET,2)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 00:06   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     D(GDP_MARKET(-1)) -0.481019 0.171970 -2.797117 0.0135 
C 0.054895 0.022477 2.442246 0.0275 
     
     R-squared 0.342793    Mean dependent var -0.006091 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298979    S.D. dependent var 0.026908 
S.E. of regression 0.022529    Akaike info criterion -4.637867 
Sum squared resid 0.007614    Schwarz criterion -4.539842 
Log likelihood 41.42187    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.628123 
F-statistic 7.823866    Durbin-Watson stat 1.767187 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.013538    
     
     
 
Regression results: 
 
Dependent Variable: DIRECT_TAX  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 02:38   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2009   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -12.35518 2.002790 -6.168981 0.0000 
GDP_FACTOR 1.625584 0.135115 12.03112 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.639921 0.157910 4.052437 0.0012 
     
     R-squared 0.990900    Mean dependent var 11.18303 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989600    S.D. dependent var 0.898453 
S.E. of regression 0.091626    Akaike info criterion -1.783423 
Sum squared resid 0.117534    Schwarz criterion -1.636385 
Log likelihood 18.15909    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.768807 
F-statistic 762.2104    Durbin-Watson stat 2.283138 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .64   
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: INDIRECT_TAX  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 12:13   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2009   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.197869 0.739448 -1.619951 0.1275 
GDP_FACTOR 0.891738 0.050490 17.66178 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.453193 0.179174 2.529344 0.0241 
     
     R-squared 0.988321    Mean dependent var 11.70277 
Adjusted R-squared 0.986652    S.D. dependent var 0.514553 
S.E. of regression 0.059447    Akaike info criterion -2.648664 
Sum squared resid 0.049476    Schwarz criterion -2.501626 
Log likelihood 25.51364    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.634048 
F-statistic 592.3545    Durbin-Watson stat 1.807187 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .45   
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: GROSS_TAX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/11/10   Time: 02:53   
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2010   
Included observations: 18 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -5.355947 1.267525 -4.225516 0.0007 
GDP_MARKET 1.203048 0.084496 14.23786 0.0000 
AR(1) 0.639060 0.132908 4.808301 0.0002 
     
     R-squared 0.992851    Mean dependent var 12.25057 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991898    S.D. dependent var 0.699908 
S.E. of regression 0.063000    Akaike info criterion -2.540353 
Sum squared resid 0.059535    Schwarz criterion -2.391958 
Log likelihood 25.86318    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.519892 
F-statistic 1041.608    Durbin-Watson stat 1.763938 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .64   
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